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Capital controls and exchange restrictions are used to restrict international capital flows during 
economic crises. This paper looks at the legal implications of these restrictions and explores the 
current international regulatory framework applicable to international capital movements and 
current payments. It shows how international capital flows suffer from the lack of a 
comprehensive and coherent regulatory framework that would harmonize the patchwork of 
multilateral, regional, and bilateral treaties that currently regulate this issue. These treaties 
include the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF Articles), the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), free-trade agreements, the European Union treaty, 
bilateral investment treaties, and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements (OECD Code of Capital Movement). Each 
of these instruments regulate differently capital movements with little coordination with other 
areas of law. This situation sometimes leads to regulatory overlaps and conflict between 
different sources of law. Given the strong links between capital movements and trade in 
services, this paper pays particular attention to the rules of the GATS on capital flows and 
discusses the policy space available in the GATS for restricting capital flows in times of crisis.  
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International flows of capital have increased over the years, driven by the reduction in regulatory 
barriers. In parallel to the benefits of capital flows
1, the need has emerged to curb the negative 
effects that are sometimes associated with an open capital account. The imposition of various 
forms of restrictions on the free flow of capital is a common measure adopted to stabilize an 
economy in time of crisis.
2  For instance, during the 1997 crisis that hit Southeast Asia, the 
governments of Thailand and Malaysia adopted currency and capital controls to restrict the 
inflow and outflow of capital and reduce the negative effects associated with them. Similar 
measures have also been adopted in Latin America and other parts of the world. The necessity 
for these types of interventions, their modalities, and also the various roles of capital 
movements in the economy have been subject to extensive analysis and debate in the 
economic literature for over 50 years.  
There is, however, a relatively small amount of literature that examines the legal implications of 
capital controls and the international regulatory regime applicable to capital flows. Given their 
multidimensional aspects (which touch upon trade, investment, and financial and monetary 
policy), capital flows are subject to the provisions of various legal instruments that differ widely 
in their scope of application, measures targeted, and remedies available. In some cases these 
instruments end up conflicting with each other, thereby creating uncertainty as to the legality of 
the measure at stake. As a consequence of the regulatory fragmentation and the lack of a clear 
discipline, a timid discussion on the necessity of the creation of a uniform and coherent 
international legal regime for capital movements has only recently begun to emerge, promoted 
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  
This paper addresses some of the main legal issues associated with capital controls and 
provides a brief overview of the various legal regimes regulating capital flows. Given the strong 
relationship between movement of capital and trade in services, the role of the GATS in 
regulating capital movements and current payments will be analyzed in particular. The research 
is not limited to regulations affecting the movement of capital as such, intended only as 
international capital account transactions and related payments. Rather, the investigation takes 
a broader perspective and focuses on the rules affecting the flow of capital, which also 
comprises payments and transfers for current international transactions. The reason for this is 
that, while capital movements are only touched by measures that affect capital account 
transactions, capital flows are also affected by exchange measures that have an impact on the 
free flow of currency as a means of payment for both current account and capital account 
transactions. Furthermore, most of the legal instruments examined provide a regulatory 
structure that takes into account both kinds of movements. 
The paper has three main parts. The first part provides a general overview of the main 
regulatory issues associated with capital flows and the role of the IMF in disciplining capital 
movements and current payments and transfers. The second part of the paper explores the 
economic relationship between capital movement and trade in services, and analyzes the 
applicable legal provisions in the GATS, as well as the policy space offered by the GATS for 
                                                  
1 This paper will differentiate between “capital movements” and “capital flows”. While  the term “capital movements” 
will describe capital account transaction, the term “capital flow” will be used to describe both the movement of 
capitals and international payments for current account transactions considered together.  
2 The extensive literature on capital flows and capital controls identifies numerous examples. For a recent survey of 
country experiences in Asia see Kaway and Lamberte (2010). For a general overview see Johnson and Tamirisa 





restricting capital flows. The third part looks at the regulation of capital movements in 
preferential trade agreements, international investment treaties, as well as in the OECD Code of 
Liberalization of Capital Movements.   
 
2. REGULATING  CAPITAL  FLOWS 
In international law, the flow of capital and foreign currency is essentially regulated by five sets 
of instruments, each setting out slightly different rules, crafted on the underlying economic or 
legal perspectives specific to each treaty. The Articles of Agreement of the International 
Monetary Fund have the fundamental aim of ensuring financial and monetary stability and 
prescribe stringent rules on payment and transfers for international current account 
transactions, while leaving room for discretion on capital account transactions. Multilateral and 
preferential agreements on services, such as the GATS and various free-trade agreements 
(FTAs), regulate current account payment and transfers as well as capital account movements 
to the extent that they are incidental to the freedom of trade in services. International investment 
agreements or bilateral investment treaties (BITs) look at capital flows as one of the collateral 
conditions necessary for ensuring freedom of investment. Capital movements are also indirectly 
affected by international financial regulations, on capital adequacy. Lastly, capital flows are 
regulated by regional treaties, such as the European Union treaty, which require freedom of 
movement of capital as one of the “four freedoms” of the single market, or by wider regional 
agreements such as the OECD Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements and the Code of 
Liberalization of Current Invisible Operations, which adopt the most comprehensive rules on 
international capital flows.  
If we consider capital flows as comprising both capital account transactions (and related 
payments and transfers) as well as payments and transfers for current account transactions, the 
regulations affecting their movement can be divided between (i) regulations targeting capital 
account transactions and their payments and transfers, (ii) regulations targeting payments and 
transfers for current account transactions, and (iii) general prudential regulations for 
international financial institutions. From a regulatory point of view, the most important distinction 
is between measures that affect capital account transactions, which are generally tolerated, and 
measures that restrict current account transactions, which are generally prohibited. While both 
measures affect capital flows, their legal regimes are invariably different across all the legal 
instruments regulating capital flows. In this respect, the IMF articles are the primary regulatory 
reference on both capital account and current account transactions, as other international 






Box 1: Defining Capital Movements 
In international law there is no comprehensive definition of “capital movements.” Indeed, neither the 
IMF articles nor the GATS or even international investment law provide a clear cut description of 
capital movements. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Code of 
Liberalization of Capital Movements, which is the only legal instrument specifically regulating capital 
account transactions and related payments, does not define capital movements either. Rather, it 
provides a description of all the capital account transactions that members must liberalize in order 
to achieve full capital account liberalization.   
In international law the only reference on the meaning of capital movement is given indirectly by 
Article XXX(d) of the IMF Agreement that instead provides a definition of “payments for current 
transaction”.  These are  payments which are not for the purpose of transferring capital, and 
includes, without limitation: 
(1) All payments due in connection with foreign trade, other current business, including services, 
and normal short-term banking and credit facilities; 
(2) Payments due as interest on loans and as net income from other investments; 
(3) Payments of moderate amount for amortization of loans or for depreciation of direct 
investments; and 
(4) Moderate remittances for family living expenses. 
The IMF definition of international current payments is very broad, and in some cases it comprises 
also transactions that economist usually inscribe to capital account, such as (i) payments of 
moderate amount for amortization of loans or for depreciation of direct investments, (ii) moderate 
remittances for family living expenses, and (iii) normal short-term banking and credit facilities. From 
this definition is possible to reconstruct a contrario a rough and partial definition of capital 
movement, which can be defined as all the transactions that operate on the capital account and are 
not comprised in the list of Article XXX (d).
b  
The distinction between capital account transactions, which imply capital movement, and current 
account transaction, which entails trade in goods and services, is of outmost importance from a 
regulatory perspective, as each transaction is subject to a complete different regulatory regime. The 
dichotomy between capital and current account transaction permeate the whole legal regime on 
capital movement, as the distinction is applied in all the international treaties concerning capital 
movements.  
a  Articles of the Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Article XXX(d).  
b  IMF. 2010. The Fund’s Role Regarding Cross-Border Capital Flows. Washington, DC. 
Source: Author 
 
2.1  The Movement of Capitals in the International Monetary Fund 
Articles 
Capital can flow among countries as an asset in a capital account transaction. In order to enable 
capital transactions, it is necessary that the country open its capital account, which in broad 
terms requires the easing of restrictions on international purchases, and sales of real and 
financial assets recorded in the capital account of the balance of payments. The assets that can 
be traded in the capital account are usually differentiated between portfolio and foreign direct 





facilities and substantial equity investment in domestic companies, while portfolio investment 
involves the purchase of financial assets, such as stocks, bonds, foreign currency, derivatives, 
and bank loans (Neely 1999). The opening of the capital account is not an all-or-nothing issue; it 
can be gradual and, depending on the kind of assets traded, it requires different measures.
3 
Usually FDIs are the first assets to be liberalized, as they are usually less volatile and do not 
pose much of a macroeconomic problem. Portfolio transactions are considered more volatile 
and pose a number of problems from a macroeconomic perspective. When a country liberalizes 
both FDI and portfolio flows, it has adopted “capital account convertibility,” which can be defined 
as the freedom to convert at the market rate domestic financial assets into foreign financial 
asset and vice versa, and broadly it entails the possibility for foreigners and nationals to convert 
currency for operations affecting the capital account (such as FDIs and portfolio operations), as 
well as for current payments (Reserve Bank of India 1997).  
As mentioned, the distinction between capital account transactions (movement of capitals) and 
related payments and current account transactions is at the core of the analysis. In this respect, 
both the IMF articles as well as other international treaties that refer to the IMF rules simply 
differentiate between capital account transactions and current account transactions.  
In the preamble to Article IV of the IMF articles, it is clarified for the first time that movement of 
capital is also an element of the international monetary system, and that stability of movement 
requires the IMF to oversee members’ policies that affect such stability. Given this, it would be 
logical to look at the IMF as the primary regulator of the international movement of capital. 
Despite the overall competence of the IMF with regard to the international monetary system, it 
does not control the movement of capital; each member still largely regulates movement 
independently.  
The main provision on capital movements in the IMF Articles is contained in Article VI, Section 
3, which stipulates that members may exercise controls that 
 
“..are necessary to regulate international capital movements, but no member may 
exercise these controls in a manner which will restrict payments for current transactions 
or which will unduly delay transfers of funds in settlement of commitments, except as 
provided in Article VII, Section 3(b) and in Article XIV, Section 2 (IMF).   
Thus, as far the IMF’s jurisdiction is concerned, this provision structures a regulatory dichotomy 
between current account measures, which are generally strictly regulated by the IMF, and 
capital account measures, which are generally regulated by the member states.  
According to the rules of the IMF, members generally retain the exclusive right to regulate both 
inward and outward capital movements and decide whether such regulation is necessary. 
Despite their comprehensive autonomy in regulating capital movements, IMF members are 
bound by a few provisions of the IMF treaty that ensure the IMF has some influence over capital 
controls. In this respect, the IMF has the power to intervene and to provide guidance to 
members on the adoption of measures that affect the capital account in three distinct areas.  
First, a member cannot use IMF resources to meet a large or sustained outflow of capital
.4 The 
reason to this is that the IMF’s resources are primarily directed at correcting current account 
                                                  
3 For example, it is possible to attract FDI without excessive opening of the capital account, such as through transfer 
of funds provisions (Williamson and Drabek 1999)  





deficits, which falls within its mandate. Such financing will allow the elimination of current 
account restrictions. The jurisprudence of the IMF has never clarified the precise meaning of 
“large or sustained outflow,” either from a conceptual or temporal point of view. Nevertheless, 
the practice of the IMF has been to determine the concept of large or sustained outflow with 
regard to the overall mandate of the IMF in providing financial assistance, and, therefore, 
looking at the underlying reasons that led to the outflow. In this respect, if such outflow of capital 
was due to problems in fiscal or exchange policy, which are in the mandate of the IMF, it would 
primarily look at whether the use of IMF resources would resolve the underlying fiscal or 
monetary difficulties (IMF 2010). 
Another issue is whether the IMF can request that a member either imposes capital controls or 
eliminates capital controls as a condition for the use IMF resources. The nexus between capital 
controls and IMF conditionality is provided by Article V, Section 3, which provides that the IMF 
shall adopt policies regarding the use of its resources that will (i) help members to solve their 
balance-of-payment difficulties in a manner consistent with the provisions of the IMF articles, 
and (ii) establish adequate safeguards for the temporary use of IMF general resources. 
According to this provision, the IMF is entitled to require the member to adopt capital controls as 
a condition to access resources. This is also confirmed in the above-mentioned Article VI, 
Section 1(a) that allows the IMF to require a member to adopt capital controls in order to 
prevent a large or sustained capital outflow as a preliminary condition before being allowed to 
apply for the resources of the IMF (provided that such controls result in effective limiting of the 
outflow). If the member does not adopt capital controls as requested by the IMF, it will be not 
allowed to access IMF resources.
5  Conversely, the lack of jurisdiction of the IMF in capital 
account transactions is generally intended to prevent it from requesting a member to remove 
capital controls as a condition of access to IMF resources. However, one exception to this 
practice does not allow members using IMF resources to apply capital controls in a manner that 
will give rise to external payment arrears (IMF 2010c).  
 
Lastly, Article IV, Section 1 of the IMF articles provides the general obligations on members to 
“avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary system in order to prevent 
effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other 
members” (IMF). Despite its wide coverage, Article IV has been considered to be advisory in 
nature and not directly enforceable. According to the jurisprudence, the breach of a member of 
one of the provisions of Section 1 will be considered only as a breach of the general obligation 
to collaborate, and will not give rise to any specific action. If a member violates one of the 
provisions, the IMF will be allowed to recommend that the member take or refrain from taking 
additional actions, as it deems appropriate. Nevertheless, the intention is that Section 1(iii) also 
covers movement of capital. In particular, the intention is that the unclear “manipulating 
exchange rate or the international monetary system” includes excessive intervention in the 
                                                                                                                                                          
(a) A member may not use the Fund's general resources to meet a large or sustained outflow of capital 
except as provided in Section 2 of this Article, and the Fund may request a member to exercise controls to 
prevent such use of the general resources of the Fund. If, after receiving such a request, a member fails to 
exercise appropriate controls, the Fund may declare the member ineligible to use the general resources of 
the Fund. (b) Nothing in this Section shall be deemed: (i) to prevent the use of the general resources of the 
Fund for capital transactions of reasonable amount required for the expansion of exports or in the ordinary 
course of trade, banking, or other business; or (ii) to affect capital movements which are met out of a 
member's own resources, but members undertake that such capital movements will be in accordance with 
the purposes of the Fund (Articles of the Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Article IV, Section 1  
5 The IMF has included in its economic programs during economic crises controls on capital outflows where large 
outflows have threatened to overwhelm emergency financing (including under IMF arrangements) and deplete 





exchange rate markets or the imposition of capital controls. For this reason, capital controls 
deemed to be used as a way of preventing balance of payment adjustments or gaining an unfair 
competitive advantage over other members would be likely to trigger the soft intervention of the 
IMF.
6  
2.2  International Current Payments and Transfers in the International 
Monetary Fund Articles 
Current account transactions involve trade of goods and services that are recorded in the 
current account of the balance of payments. Current account transactions as such do not imply 
any capital movements because there is no transaction operated in the capital account. 
Nevertheless, payments and transfers associated with such transactions involve the free use of 
foreign currency, which leads to an international flow of currency among countries in order to 
allow the payment of the transaction. When countries allow international payments and transfers 
for current account transactions, they adopt current account convertibility, which allows 
residents to receive foreign currency for exports of goods and services and to pay in foreign 
currency for the import of goods and services.  
Capital flows related to the payments and transfers associated with current account transactions 
can be affected by exchange restrictions and multicurrency arrangements. Such measures are 
similar to those applied to capital account transactions but, unlike those applied to capital 
transactions, they are generally forbidden by the IMF and other international treaties.  
In this respect, the limited competence of the IMF with regard to capital account transactions 
stands in contrast with the parallel full competence on current account transactions. Indeed, 
Article VIII, Section 2(a) imposes that members refrain from imposing restrictions on the making 
of payments and transfers for current international transactions. As we saw before (Box 1), the 
definition of “payments and transfers for current international transaction” provided by Article 
XXX(d) is broader than the definition used by economists or balance of payment statisticians. 
This means that the jurisdiction of the IMF (and all other treaties that make reference to the IMF 
rules) on current account transactions also encompasses certain capital movements.   
Article VIII:2 of the IMF articles forbids exchange restrictions on current account payments. This 
provision imposes two obligations on IMF members. First, a member must not limit or impede 
any of its residents from obtaining the foreign currency necessary for making payments to 
nonresidents in settlement of the underlying current transactions. Second, members must 
permit nonresidents that have acquired balances of the country’s currency by engaging in 
international current transactions with members to transfer that currency or convert it to a freely 
usable currency and transfer it abroad, as long as this does not represent a capital movement. 
Article VIII, Section 2(b) provides that exchange contracts involving the currency of any other 
member and which are contrary to the exchange control regulations of that member that are 
maintained or imposed consistently with the IMF articles shall be unenforceable in the territories 
of that member. The previous consensus was that capital restrictions in the form of exchange 
controls that affect current account payments would be considered as falling within the ambit of 
application of this provision, and therefore be unenforceable. Nevertheless, the German national 
court called to interpret this provision has held that the lack of competence of the IMF on capital 
transactions renders this provision applicable only to contracts involving exchange control 
restrictions on current transactions (Helizalde 2004).  
                                                  





Article VIII, Section 3 prohibits members from engaging in discriminatory currency arrangements 
or multicurrency practices that occur when different groups of foreign exchange transactions are 
conducted at different exchange rates, resulting in a spread of more than 2% between buying 
and selling rates for spot exchange transactions.
7 According to the jurisprudence of Article VIII, 
the prohibition applies only to multicurrency practices that relate only to current account 
transactions, and the IMF has clarified that multicurrency arrangements that apply to capital 
transactions can be adopted by members whenever they may be reasonably needed.   
Despite the overall competence of the IMF on current account measures, members are allowed 
to impose restrictions on current payments and transfers when (i) they have been temporarily 
approved by the executive board for balance of payments reasons, or (ii) their maintenance is 
authorized under the transitional provisions under Article XIV of the IMF articles. The balance of 
payment clause acts as a safety valve in case of serious economic crisis and, with the exception 
of United States (US) FTAs and BITs, it is replicated in almost all of the international legal 
instruments that regulate capital flows.  
3.  MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL AND TRADE IN SERVICES  
International trade in services and movement of capital are two distinct issues, although in some 
cases they might overlap. The difference lies in the different role of the services transaction and 
the capital transaction when recorded in the balance of payments. While the services 
transaction is inscribed into the current account, the movement of capital implies a capital 
transaction that is to be inscribed in the capital account.  
Trade in services always involves international payments and transfers associated with 
underlying international current account transactions. However, services trade does not always 
give rise to capital movements. Broadly speaking, a service transaction involves the 
international supply of a service by a domestic service provider to a consumer abroad, or the 
access of domestic consumers to a service provided by a foreign supplier. Such transactions 
are to be recorded in the current account and give rise to payments of service fees, charges, 
and commissions. On the other hand, capital account transactions do not necessarily involve 
the provision of a service but they simply imply the creation, transfer of ownership, or liquidation 
of capital assets and the payment and transfer associated with such transaction (Key 2003). 
Among various kinds of capital assets that could form a capital transaction, financial assets are 
those closely associated with a provision of a service. In this respect, both the use of foreign 
capital by domestic consumers and the use of domestic capital by nonresidents imply the 
access to a banking service, which also results in payment of a service fee (Lehmann, Tamirisa, 
and Wieczorek 2003).  
                                                  
7 IMF Decision No. 6790-(81/43) of 20 March 1981 defines multicurrency practices as  
action by a member or its fiscal agencies that of itself gives rise to a spread of more than 2 percent between buying 
and selling rates for spot exchange transactions between the member's currency and any other member's currency 
would be considered a multiple currency practice and would require the prior approval of the Fund (IMF Executive 






Box 2: Dissecting Capital Movements from Services Trade 
Kono and Schuknecht (1999) provide a clear example of the difference between a supply of a 
service that entails capital flow and a pure service transaction without capital movement. In the 
example there are six situations that can apply:  
1) A lending transaction in local currency between a domestic financial service provider and a 
domestic customer. In this case there is neither trade in services nor capital movement.  
2) A lending transaction in foreign currency between a domestic financial service provider and 
a domestic customer. In this case there is movement of capital but no trade in services.  
3) A lending transaction in local currency between a domestic financial service provider and a 
foreign customer consuming abroad. In this case there is no movement of capital but there is 
trade in services.  
4) A cross-border lending transaction in foreign currency between a financial service provider 
in country A and a customer in country B. In this case there is trade in services (mode 1) and 
capital movement.  
5) A lending transaction in domestic currency between a foreign financial service provider in 
country B (mode 3) and a domestic customer. In this case there is trade in services but no 
capital movement, as the lending transaction uses domestic currency.  
6) A lending transaction in foreign currency between a foreign financial services provider in 
country B (mode 3) and a domestic customer. In this case there is movement of capital and 
trade in services. 
From these examples it is clear that there is pure trade in services in situations 3 and 5, pure 
capital movement in situation 2, and trade in service and capital movement in situations 4 and 6.  
Source: This box draws on M. Kono and L. Schuknecht. 1999. Financial Services Trade, Capital Flows, and Financial 
Stability. Staff Working Paper ERAD-98-12. Geneva: World Trade Organization. 
The direction and the kind of capital moved depend highly on the typology of the service and its 
mode of supply. In this respect, the establishment of the commercial presence (mode 3) of a 
foreign service supplier requires the movement of capital necessary to acquire an existing firm 
or to purchase land and any other assets necessary to set up the operation of the company. 
Indeed, if a country commits to allowing foreign service suppliers to acquire 100% equity in a 
domestic bank, or to establish a de novo subsidiary, it essentially allows an inflow of capital to 
perform the operation. If a country wishes to block any inflow of capital, it must also block any 
FDI in the services sector. Even after that phase, there is a high possibility that the day-to-day 
operations of the subsidiary would involve a movement of capital. This will happen if the 
activities of the subsidiary imply transactions in foreign financial assets with host-country 
residents. Similarly, the creation of branches and their day-to-day activities almost invariably 
involve capital movements necessary to perform the initial investment and to conduct portfolio 
transactions with the head office (Key 2003). It is important to note that, for what concerns the 
GATS, the movement of capital related to the establishment of a commercial presence is only 
inward (Kono and Schuknecht 1999). This means that, unlike BITs or FTAs, the GATS does not 
control or regulate the outward movement of capital resulting from the operations of the foreign-
invested company, such as repatriation of profits or transfer of funds. Furthermore, once a 
foreign service supplier is incorporated in the host country it is generally considered a domestic 
company and therefore subject to the domestic laws on capital movement. Therefore, despite 
the fact that the operations of the company involve international movement of capital, a member 





without violating any GATS rule, as long as it does not negatively discriminate between foreign 
and domestic companies,.  
Another mode of supply that gives rise to substantial capital movement is mode 1. The cross-
border supply of a service, when it entails movement of capital, can give rise to both inward and 
outward capital flows. The cross-border movement of capital is typical of financial services. One 
example could be a domestic bank making loans to or accepting deposits from nonresident 
customers. Similarly, in the securities sector most international portfolio transactions are 
associated with securities trading or asset management services provided by a host bank to a 
nonresident investor. Capital movements could be theoretically covered by mode 2, when a 
consumer moves to another country to enjoy a service, bringing their own money to pay for the 
service. Nonetheless the footnote to Article XVI limits the coverage of capital movements only to 
mode-1 and mode-3.  
3.1  Regulating Capital Flows in the GATS 
The GATS essentially provides a regulatory platform on which countries can exchange and 
commit to mutual market access concessions for the supply of services. More specifically, in the 
GATS . members can commit to allowing foreign service providers to supply their services 
through any of the four modes of supply. Based on the specific and horizontal commitment, the 
scheduled services must abide by the rules provided in the GATS.  
Among the WTO agreements, the GATS is the only one that regulates both transfers and 
payments for service transactions as well as pure capital movements. More specifically, the 
regulatory regime adopted by the GATS envisages capital flows in the form of current payments 
and transfers required to perform a service transaction, as well as pure capital movements as a 
necessary element of most financial services trades. 
From the provisions of Articles XI and XII, it is possible to argue that, even in the GATS (and 
similar to the IMF), the dichotomy between capital account transactions and current account 
transactions exists, with current account transactions being heavily controlled and subject to the 
regulations of the IMF, and capital account transactions being substantially liberalized and 
subject only to balance of payments or prudential restrictions, as stipulated in the GATS.  
Article XI of the GATS stipulates the following:  
“1. Except under the circumstances envisaged in Article XII, a Member shall not apply 
restrictions on international transfers and payments for current transactions relating to 
its specific commitments. (emphasis added) 
2. Nothing in this Agreement shall affect the rights and obligations of the members of the 
International Monetary Fund under the Articles of Agreement of the Fund, including the use of 
exchange actions which are in conformity with the Articles of Agreement, provided that a 
Member shall not impose restrictions on any capital transactions inconsistently with its 
specific commitments regarding such transactions, except under Article XII or at the 
request of the Fund” (emphasis added) (WTO) 
3.1.1 Capital  Movements 
The GATS does not provide a regulatory platform for movement of capital as it does for 
services. In this respect, countries cannot seek market access and regulatory conditions for 
their capital, as it is provided in the OECD Capital Movement Code. Nevertheless, as was 
mentioned earlier, capital movements are sometimes implied in financial services trade as one 





of capital do not undermine the freedom of trade of other members, according to the specific 
commitment applicable.  
The most important provision, and the only one that directly regulates movement of capital, is a 
footnote to the market access provision of GATS Article XVI:1, which stipulates that 
“With respect to market access through the modes of supply identified in Article I, each Member 
shall accord services and service suppliers of any other Member treatment no less favourable 
than that provided for under the terms, limitations and conditions agreed and specified in its 
Schedule”. 
A footnote to this provision provides: 
“If a Member undertakes a market-access commitment in relation to the supply of a service 
through the mode of supply referred to in subparagraph 2(a) of Article I and if the cross-border 
movement of capital is an essential part of the service itself, that Member is thereby committed 
to allow such movement of capital. If a Member undertakes a market-access commitment in 
relation to the supply of a service through the mode of supply referred to in subparagraph 2(c) of 
Article I, it is thereby committed to allow related transfers of capital into its territory” 
8.  
According to the combination of these provisions, the movement of capital is regulated only 
partially and only to the extent that it is a necessary element for the supply of the service itself. 
The first paragraph of the footnote contains the first limitation, which restricts the freedom of 
capital movement only to the services sectors committed to by the members, as scheduled in 
terms of sector coverage, modes of supply, and specific reservations. The footnote provides 
another important limitation, this time specifically linked to the modes of supply of the services. 
In this respect, the footnote obliges the members to allow the movement of capital only in 
relation to the market access commitments (not on nondiscrimination), when the cross-border 
movement of capital is “an essential part of the [mode 1] service itself,” or when the obligation to 
allow commercial presence implies the related transfer of capital in the territory.  
Both the first and second sentences of the footnote to Article XVI mention the movement of 
capital as an essential part of the service supplied on a cross-border basis, and as a transfer 
related to the establishment of the commercial presence of a service supplier. In this respect, 
the movement of capital covered in the GATS is of two kinds: the first covers the inflow of 
capital related to the establishment and the continuation of a commercial presence (i.e., the 
amount of assets necessary to establish the business and possibly acquire land); the second 
covers the cross-border movement of capital which is required by the supply of a service 
through mode 1. In this second case, the cross-border movement covers both inflow and 
outflow of capital.  
One issue to be clarified is whether the GATS imposes a general prohibition on any restrictions 
on the movement of capital associated with the services scheduled, or whether the prohibition is 
limited only to the situations mentioned in the footnote to Article XVI, which restrict the ambit of 
application to restrictions on capital inflow for sectors scheduled in mode 1 and 3, and for 
restrictions on capital outflow for sectors scheduled in mode 1. Take for example the case of a 
domestic consumer located in country A who travels to country B to open a bank account in a 
local bank, bringing with them a sum of money to deposit in the new account. This is a classical 
example of mode 2, where a consumer moves to another territory to enjoy a service supplied in 
that territory. Restrictions on market access for mode 2 would basically consist of preventing 
domestic consumers from enjoying the services provided in another country. The imposition of 
capital controls on the outflow of currency would therefore affect the supply of financial services 
                                                  





through mode 2. Nonetheless, the footnote to Article XVI does not mention this situation, which 
fall outside the coverage of the GATS. 
Table 1: Coverage of Capital Movements in the GATS by Modes of Supply and Directions 
Flow  Mode 1  Mode 2  Mode 3  Mode 4 
Inflow  yes  no  yes  no 
Outflow  yes  no  no  no 
Source: Author 
Based on these provisions, the movement of capital allowed in the GATS is fully covered only in 
mode 1 and partially covered in mode 2 (only outflow) and mode 3 (only inflow). The GATS 
does not cover the outflow of capital related to the investment, which is heavily regulated in BITs 
and in some FTAs. For the sectors and modes covered by the general prohibition on capital 
controls, there are still three exceptions that can apply.  
 
The first exception is provided in the second paragraph of Article XI, which allow members to 
impose restrictions for balance of payment reasons, as stipulated by Article XII. The second 
exceptions refers to a specific request from the IMF to impose capital restriction. In this regard, 
despite the general lack of competence of the IMF in capital account transactions, Article VI 
Section 1 of the IMF articles authorizes the IMF to request that a member imposes capital 
controls to prevent a large or sustained outflow of capital. Accordingly, this provision provides 
the IMF with the authority to authorize a WTO member to derogate to its GATS commitments 
when such member is suffering from a large or sustained outflow of capital. Note that the 
authority of the IMF not only extends to the sectors and modes covered by the footnote but it 
also covers the right to impose capital controls as such. Lastly, capital movements could be 
restricted based on prudential grounds, based on the letter of the “prudential carve-out” of 
Article II of the Annex on Financial Services.  
3.1.2  Current Payments and Exchange Restrictions 
According to the letter of Article XI, current account transactions and capital account 
transactions are treated differently. The first paragraph of Article XI stipulates that, for all those 
services sectors that are committed to by a member, it is not possible to apply any restriction on 
international transfers and payments for the underlying current transaction. This provision, 
however, has two limitations. The first is set out in paragraph 2 of the same article, which carves 
out from the prohibition those exchange measures that are in conformity with the IMF article.
9 
The second limitation is provided in Article XII of the GATS that allows restrictions on current 
international transactions (and related payments) for balance of payment purposes. Despite the 
limited possibility for members to adopt current account restrictions provided by the GATS, it is 
important to remember that WTO members that are also members of the IMF are bound by the 
general prohibition of Article VIII of the IMF articles that imposes an obligation on the members 
not to adopt any current account restriction. This means that, even if a member wishes to 
impose a restriction on a sector not committed to in its services schedule, it would nevertheless 
be bound by its IMF obligations. In this respect, the reference to the IMF articles allows a limited 
possibility to impose restrictions on current payments and transfers for balance of payment 
                                                  





reasons, provided that they have been temporarily approved of by the executive board, or their 
maintenance is authorized by Article XIV of the IMF articles (IMF 2010b).  
Paragraph 2 of Article XI contains a general provision that ensures the prevalence of IMF rights 
over GATS obligations. Among the rights of IMF members under the articles of the agreement is 
the use of exchange actions. Deborah Siegel, once IMF general counsel, considers such 
obligation to include “the requirement to refrain from imposing exchange restrictions on 
payments and transfers for current international transactions, multiple currency practices, and 
discriminatory currency arrangements unless approved by the Fund or maintained under Article 
XIV” (Siegel 2002). One important note is that exchange restrictions that impose a direct 
limitation on the availability of foreign currency or on their use and transfer and could cover both 
current and capital account transactions (as well as the underlying payment). While exchange 
restrictions affecting current account transactions are generally prohibited under the IMF articles 
and therefore are also not allowed by the GATS, the same does not apply to exchange 
restrictions on capital account transactions. Indeed, restrictions on international payments and 
transfers apply only to the underlying services transactions that have been liberalized by the 
members in their schedules of commitments. 
3.2  Policy Space for Capital Controls 
Capital and exchange controls represent a deviation from the freedom of capital movement 
based on financial or macroeconomic considerations. Indeed, from the experience of various 
countries in recent years, its seems that the  reason  for the adoption of capital controls was 
almost entirely protection of the stability of the financial system. Provided that this is the main 
reason, then the question to ask is, does the GATS offer any latitude for members to deviate 
from their commitments and block movements of capital? Before explaining the issue, it is 
important once again to stress one important point: while capital account transactions enjoy a 
high degree of flexibility, this is not the same for controls on current account payments and 
transfers, which are generally prohibited and whose legitimacy at the WTO can only derive from 
approval by the IMF or by the balance of payments provision of Article XII.  
Members have various ways to impose restrictions on capital flows. In addition to the possibility 
of imposing controls on capital movements when requested by the IMF, members can restrain 
capital flows, both current payment and capital movements, based on balance of payment 
considerations and on prudential reasons.  
Table 2: Brief Summary of The Coverage and Treatment of Capital Flow in the GATS 
 
Capital Movement (and Capital 
Payments and Transfers) 
Current Payments and 
Transfers 
Coverage  Only mode 1, and 3, and only 
services scheduled in those modes 







Request by the IMF  Yes No 
IMF = International Monetary Fund 





3.2.1  The Balance of Payment Derogation 
Article XII then provides for the conditions under which a member can derogate from its 
obligations in case of balance of payment difficulties: 
“1. In the event of serious balance of payments and external financial difficulties or threat 
thereof, a Member may adopt or maintain restrictions on trade in services on which it has 
undertaken specific commitments, including on payments or transfers for transactions related to 
such commitments. It is recognized that particular pressures on the balance of payments of a 
Member in the process of economic development or economic transition may 
necessitate the use of restrictions to ensure, inter alia, the maintenance of a level of financial 
reserves adequate for the implementation of its programme of economic development or 
economic transition. 
2. The restrictions referred to in paragraph 1: 
(a) Shall not discriminate among Members; 
(b) Shall be consistent with the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund; 
(c) Shall avoid unnecessary damage to the commercial, economic and financial interests of any 
other Member; 
(d) Shall not exceed those necessary to deal with the circumstances described in paragraph 1; 
(e) Shall be temporary and be phased out progressively as the situation specified in paragraph 
1 improves” (GATS, Article XII:1-2). 
This provision allows members to deviate from their commitments in both capital movement and 
current account transactions in the event of both current serious balance of payments or 
external financial difficulties and in the case of a threat of a crisis. Particular consideration is 
then given to developing countries, which are considered more prone to monetary instability 
associated with opening of the capital account. To invoke Article XII, members must 
demonstrate that the measure (i) does not discriminate against members, (ii) is consistent with 
IMF articles (which restrict the policy space only on capital account restrictions allowed by the 
IMF) and current account restrictions approved by the IMF,
10 (iii) does not cause unnecessary 
damage to other members, (iv) shall not be unnecessary in respect to the conditions set out 
above, and (v) shall be only temporary.  
One of the major issues is whether the balance of payment provision can be applied only to 
restrict capital outflow. This issue was a matter of debate between the IMF and OECD in the 
1990s. During discussions for the OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment, the IMF 
expressed the view that only capital controls on outflows could cause serious balance of 
payment difficulties or depletion of monetary reserves; the OECD argued that inflows could also 
cause macroeconomic disturbances (Auboin 2010). The different view is of outmost importance 
from a practical perspective. Indeed, if the IMF view was accepted, the balance of payment 
derogation would be essentially limited to measures targeting capital outflow, which are covered 
only by mode 1 commitments. Clearly, derogations affecting payments and transfers for 
services transactions would remain fully covered as they entail an outflow of currency. 
Nevertheless, this issue is still to be tested by the jurisprudence, as Article XII has never been 
invoked in practice.  
                                                  
10 One example is the current and capital account restrictions approved by the IMF on Iceland during the 
financial crisis of 2008. In order to be approved, Iceland had to comply with the recommendations of the 





3.2.2  The Prudential Carve-Out  
The Annex on Financial Services is a specific agreement to the GATS that clarifies existing 
GATS rules as they apply to the specificities of the financial services sector. Thus, the 
regulatory constraints on the trade of financial services products, as regulated under the GATS, 
obliged negotiators to inscribe in the annex a provision that would prevent strict obedience to 
the rules of the GATS from undermining the stability of the financial system. For this reason a 
provision was inserted in the annex that would guarantee the freedom of the members to adopt 
any measure aimed at maintaining the soundness of the financial system despite its possible 
incompatibility with the provisions of the GATS. This provision is commonly known as the 
“prudential-carve out” and it provides as follows: 
Notwithstanding any other provisions of the Agreement, a Member shall not be prevented from 
taking measures for prudential reasons, including for the protection of investors, depositors, 
policy holders or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial service supplier, or to 
ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system. Where such measures do not conform 
with the provisions of the Agreement, they shall not be used as a means of avoiding the 
Member’s commitments or obligations under the Agreement (WTO,   
Annex A. GATS, Annex on Financial Services, Article 2).   
In this respect, any domestic measure that might be inconsistent with Articles XVI or VI of the 
GATS, as in the case of financial safety measures, can nevertheless be justified on prudential 
grounds once it is proven that it has been adopted to accomplish prudential objectives. Briefly, 
this clause operates as an escape clause that derogates from the general obligation to the 
GATS, based on the prevalence of macroeconomic stability against the positive effects of trade 
liberalization.  
Based on the prudential carve-out, members could impose restrictions on capital flows in order 
to maintain or restore the stability of the financial system. The definition of prudential reasons, 
which is the subject of an infinite academic debate, would define the perimeter of legitimacy of 
the measure. As yet there has not been any dispute that clarifies the actual ambit of the 
provisions or which kind of measures are considered to be of a prudential nature. A possible 
interpretation of this provision would limit the possible measures to those that are strictly linked 
to the stability of the banking system, leaving aside other macroeconomic or balance of 
payment considerations, which would be covered by Article XII. Based on this interpretation, the 
regulatory space offered by Article 2 is somehow different from that of Article XII. Indeed, while 
capital controls adopted for balance of payment reasons are essentially covered by the balance 
of payment derogation, the prudential carve-out is limited to issues of financial stability, and for 
this reason it is more suited to the adoption of controls on short-term capital flows or on risky 
financial products.  
4.  A PREFERENTIAL AGENDA FOR CAPITAL FLOWS 
The internal resistance of countries to relinquish control of their capital account policies 
constituted an insurmountable difficulty for the process of international financial and monetary 
rule making on capital flows. The IMF, which in the mid-1990s pushed for more stringent 
regulations on capital movement, failed to convince countries to give up their sovereignty on 
capital account policies. Similarly, in Geneva during the Uruguay round negotiations on services 
and financial services, capital flows were left out of the WTO agenda. Nonetheless, countries 
progressively engaged in preferential arrangements in which capital controls were part of the 
regulatory undertaking. Indeed, at the preferential level, capital flows are regulated by three sets 





Given the complexity of the task and the differences in policy space with regard to restriction of 
capital flows among the various agreements, a comprehensive analysis of capital flow 
regulations in preferential trade and investment agreements would take a chapter itself. 
Nonetheless, it is important to briefly introduce some considerations that offer the basis for 
future research.  
4.1  Free-Trade Agreements 
FTAs often cover capital flows, either as a stand-alone chapter, as in the case of European 
Union (EU) agreements, or in the framework of services and investment chapters. One common 
treatment is in the services dimension of EU and US FTAs that offer a GATS-like approach. In 
these FTAs countries are required to liberalize the capital movements associated with services 
commitments. In addition to this (and similar to the GATS), countries are required to liberalize 
the payments and transfers associated with the transactions based on the requirements of IMF 
Article VIII. Apart from these similarities, among various FTAs there are differences in the level 
of opening to capital flows and on the potential use of safeguards. Indeed, while EU, Canadian, 
and Japanese FTAs provide balance of payment safeguards or regulatory carve-outs on host-
country capital account legislations, US FTAs (with the notable exception of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) are more prone towards full liberalization of capital movements 
and usually do not provide for balance of payment exceptions or other safeguards against 
possible negative effects of capital flows.
11  
4.2  International Investment Agreements 
International investment agreements, whether in the form of BITs or as stand-alone chapters in 
FTAs, provide for strong discipline for capital movements, albeit with a narrower focus than 
services agreements. While trade agreements promote the inflow of capital as an element of the 
services package, leaving the free outflow only to financial services in mode 1, most bilateral 
investment treaties leave aside the market access and/or pre-establishment aspect (although 
there are notable exceptions) and regulate the movement of capital from an investor perspective 
at the post-establishment phase. Hence, the regulatory framework offered by international 
investment agreements usually covers only outflow of capital.  
 
In international investment agreements, capital movements can be regulated in two ways: first, 
capital can be considered as a form of investment itself, thereby enjoying the protections offered 
by the treaties; second, capital can be considered as one of the essential elements of an 
investment.  
The definition of investment is one of the elements that determine the coverage of the treaty. In 
this respect, a common definition of investment is that it comprises not only physical assets 
located in the host country but also other intangible assets of particular value to the investors, 
such as mortgages, liens, pledges, and portfolio investment in the form of shares, stocks, debts, 
                                                  
11  One notable feature is contained in the US–Chile FTA, and has been replicated in US FTAs with 
Colombia, Peru, and Singapore. In these agreements there is a cooling-off provision, which allows 
countries to violate the terms of the treaty on capital movements (albeit only those in the investment chapter) for a 
period of 1 year after the measure has been deployed, without the threat of being sued by the US. The cooling-off 
provision is somehow limited in practice, as it does not apply to restrictions on current transfers and on payment for 
equity investments, bonds, or loans. In addition, after 1 year the violating party would have to respond in an 
international tribunal. The aim of this provision was to provide countries with some policy space during times of 





or interests in the property of local companies.
12 Provided that the treaty also covers financial 
assets, the question is how portfolio investment is regulated. In this respect, international 
investment agreements provide a number of clauses that aim at ensuring that investors are 
protected against the powers of the host state. Among the most important clauses that have an 
effect are (i) the most-favored nation clause; (ii) the nondiscrimination clause; (iii) the fair and 
equitable treatment clause; (iv) the expropriation clause; (v) the so-called “free transfer of fund” 
provision; and (v) in some cases, the balance of payment clause. Such clauses have the goal of 
ensuring that foreign investors are not treated arbitrarily or in a discriminatory way by the host 
government and, depending on the specific provisions in the treaty, the clauses could limit the 
possibility of the host government adopting capital or exchange controls. For example, the 
decision of the host state to adopt currency exchange restrictions could be considered a form of 
indirect expropriation as it could substantially diminish the value of the investment (Kolo and 
Walde 2008)  
When an international investment agreement does not cover portfolio investment, financial 
assets do not enjoy the protection of the treaty. Nevertheless, capital flows are still partially 
regulated as a collateral element of the investment. The “free transfer of fund” provision is a 
common feature of international investment agreements and it ensures the right of investors to 
repatriate their assets at all times, guarding against possible restrictions imposed by the host 
state. Such transfer provisions, if not matched by other safeguard measures, could substantially 
limit the monetary sovereignty of the countries, especially their right to control their balance of 
payments (on both current and capital account).  
Free transfer of fund provisions differ widely among agreements. One common treatment is that 
they almost all apply only to the outflow of capital and only rarely cover the freedom of investors 
to bring in their capital (Dolzer and Schreuer 2008). A broad classification of transfer of fund 
provisions has been provided by Sean Hagan. It divides such clauses into three categories. The 
first category consists of the outward transfer of amounts derived from or associated with 
protected investments. The second category entails outward transfer of amounts arising 
from the host country’s performance of other investor protection obligations under an 
agreement.
13 The third category  covers inward transfer of amounts to be invested by a 
foreign investor, which covers those transfers that are made for purposes of making a new 
investment, as well as those that are made to develop or maintain an existing investment 
(Hagan 2000).  
 
                                                  
12 As an example, Article 1(3) of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Agreement for the Promotion 
and Protection of Investment defines the term “investment” as  
every kind of asset and in particular shall include though not exclusively: 
a) Movable and immovable property and any other property rights such as mortgages, liens 
and pledges; 
b) Shares, stocks and debentures of companies or interests in the property of such 
companies; 
c) Claims to money or to any performance under contract having a financial value; 
d) Intellectual property rights and goodwill; 
e) Business concessions conferred by law or under contract, including concessions to search for, 
cultivate, extract or exploit natural resources (Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investment, Article 1(3)) 
13 Free transfer of fund would usually cover (i) payments received as compensation for a host country’s expropriation 
of the investment, (ii) payments received as compensation for losses suffered by an investor as a result of an 
armed conflict or civil disturbance, (iii) payments arising from the settlement of disputes, and (iv) payments of 





It is important to note that a corollary of free transfer of fund provisions is the obligation on the 
government to allow the repatriation of funds at a market-determined exchange rate. Indeed, 
governments usually allow the repatriation of profits at a market rate that is above the market 
price rate. This tendency does not fall under the IMF’s general prohibition of multicurrency 
practices, as Article VIII, Section 3 of the IMF articles only prescribes nondiscrimination between 
current transfers or capital transfers. For this reason, many BITs provide for a guarantee that 
the exchange rate is at the market price (Weibel 2009). 
Balance of payment and state of necessity clauses are sometimes included in FTAs and in a 
few BITs to safeguard the stability of the financial system against some economic disequilibria. 
Such clauses allow derogation from the commitments for a certain period of time provided that 
the member adopting such measure demonstrates that movements of capital cause, or threaten 
to cause, serious economic or financial disturbance in the member and that the measure is 
adopted on a temporary and nondiscriminatory basis. In some agreements, the balance of 
payment safeguard is crafted to guarantee that the measure would be in conformity with IMF 
Articles VI and VIII.
14  
The EU–Republic of Korea FTA provides a set of conditions for the measure to be considered 
legitimate. The footnote to Article 8.4 provides that  
safeguard measures provided for in this Article should be applied in such a way that they: 
(a) are not confiscatory; 
(b) do not constitute a dual or multiple exchange rate practice; 
(c) do not otherwise interfere with investors’ ability to earn a market rate of return in the territory 
of the Party who took safeguard measures on any restricted assets; 
(d) avoid unnecessary damage to the commercial, economic or financial interests of the other 
Party; 
(e) are temporary and phased out progressively as the situation calling for imposition of such 
measures improves; and 
(f) are promptly published by the competent authorities responsible for foreign exchange policy 
(Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Korea, Article 8.4) 
The EU’s FTAs often provide for a carve-out of the national legislation on capital movements 
and current payments that has the effect that any domestic measure falling within the ambit of 
application of the exception is automatically in compliance.
15 An example is Article 2 of Chapter 
8 of the EU–Republic of Korea FTA that provides that  
With regard to transactions on the capital and financial account of balance of payments, the 
Parties undertake to impose no restrictions on the free movement of capital relating to direct 
investments made in accordance with the laws of the host country, to investments and other 
transactions liberalised in accordance with Chapter Seven (Trade in Services, Establishment 
and Electronic Commerce) and to the liquidation and repatriation of such invested capital and of 
any profit generated therefrom (Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the 
Republic of Korea, Article 2, Chapter 8).  
OECD members are parties to the Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements and the Code of 
Liberalization of Current Invisible Operations. Together these codes offer a regulatory platform 
that bind members to substantially liberalizing both types of international capital flows—from the 
                                                  
14 Look, for instance, at Article 2104 of the NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement). 





current or the capital account. The capital movements code represents the most comprehensive 
instrument regulating the movement of capital and it offers a complete regulatory platform for 
both investors and domestic operators. Unlike other instruments, the capital movements code 
focuses on the specific transactions to be liberalized, thereby covering capital transactions 
made both by nonresidents and those made by residents, as well as on the underlying 
payments and transfers. Furthermore, the code applies to both the inflow and outflow of capital. 
Despite its regulatory width, the code offers members room for various derogations from the 
commitments. Indeed, in addition to the exceptions scheduled by OECD members at the time of 
entry into force, members can derogate at any time from their commitments with regard to short-
term financial transactions. In addition, the code presents two exceptions that allow members to 
suspend their commitments and impose controls on (i) capital outflows for balance of payments 
reasons, and (ii) inflows for reasons arising from “serious economic and financial disturbances.” 
The OECD codes in some instances overlap with provisions in other FTAs and/or BITs, giving 
rise to a regulatory discrepancy, such as in the case of the FTAs negotiated by the US.  
5. CONCLUSION 
This brief introduction to the regulatory regimes for capital flows briefly introduces the 
complexity of the subject. As explained, capital flows are regulated under various regulatory 
instruments, each targeting a particular aspect of the measure. The underlying question is, to 
what extent is it possible to have a similar measure—e.g., a regulation prohibiting outflow of 
capital—treated differently based on the regulatory discipline considered?  
The first difference between instruments is in the coverage of capital flow in terms of direction of 
capital flows and targeted measures. While all the instruments always cover current payments 
and prohibit any exchange restrictions and multicurrency arrangements, each treaty covers the 
movement of capital differently and only partially. In this respect, the OECD capital movements 
code is the most comprehensive treaty, setting out precise obligations with regards to both 
inflow and outflow of capital incidental to the listed operations; the GATS and FTAs cover only 
the capital movements incidental to the scheduled services commitments. This implies a 
reduced coverage, often limited to the cross-border flow of capital incidental to mode 1, and the 
inflow of capital necessary to establish a commercial presence. Investment agreements are 
even more restrictive, covering mostly only the outflow of capital in the form of profits and 
interests incidental to the investment. Lastly, the IMF articles do not cover capital movements as 
such, but provide a supervisory role for the IMF in the capital account policies of the members.  
Most of the regulatory problems come from the possibility of adopting safeguards in the case of 
macroeconomic or financial turbulence. In this respect, the OECD code offers to signatories the 
widest policy space to impose restrictions and deviate from the commitments. Similarly, the 
GATS and most non-US FTAs allow members to impose restrictions on both capital movements 
and current payments in the case of balance of payment difficulties or when justified for 
prudential reasons. On the contrary, US FTA and/or BITs,
16  and most other BITS, do not 
envisage any possibility of restricting the outflow of capital when linked to an investment.  
This disparity results in potential overlap of norms and in regulatory uncertainty. Take, for 
instance the case of the Republic of Korea, which is an OECD and IMF member and has 
entered into FTAs with the US and with the EU. If the Republic of Korea experiences severe 
macroeconomic turbulence, the adoption of capital controls would be allowed under the OECD 
capital movement code, the IMF rules, and by the EU–Republic of Korea FTA, but it would not 
                                                  





be allowed by the US– Republic of Korea FTA. As it is impossible to select capital controls 
based on the origin or destination of the capital flow, the country adopting the measure would be 
in a regulatory dilemma that would ultimately result in the choice between macroeconomic 
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With regard to trade in services, the current regulatory regime in the GATS suffers from two 
major loopholes.  
The footnote to Article XVI, while making reference to movement of capital, does not define 
what it consists of. If we assume that the meaning of “capital” is similar to that described in the 
IMF articles, then some kind of capital transactions—such as payments of moderate amounts 
for amortization of loans or for depreciation of direct investments, moderate remittances for 
family living expenses, and normal short-term banking and credit facilities—which are usually 
described by the economists as capital movements, would be treated as current transfers, and 
therefore be subject to the strict regulatory regime. Countries would not be able to adopt any 
restrictions on such transactions unless approved by the IMF or unless justified by serious 
balance of payment considerations. Another problem might be the treatment of controls on 
capital movements related to FDI. The usual definition of capital controls is not limited to 
financial assets but it also envisages controls on FDI. If we assume that the policy space given 
by the GATS to impose restrictions on capital movement extends to FDIs, then countries would 
be able to deviate on all their market access commitments on mode 3. In this respect, one of the 
priorities would be to clarify the extent of the GATS coverage on capital account transactions. 
Another issue is linked to the policy space for capital flow restrictions in the GATS. The recent 
experience in Latin America and Southeast Asia suggests that countries are often required to 
impose restrictions on capital flows, even though their GATS commitments would bind the 
liberalization of their capital accounts. Given the regulatory uncertainties on restrictions on 
short-term flows or exchange controls, the balance of payment provision and the prudential 
carve-out, which have never been tested in practice, could not offer the necessary leeway and 
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